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IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION IN 
CONSUMER LENDING 
RICHARD A. BROWN AND SUSAN E. BURHOUSE* 
ABSTRACT 
Profound changes have taken place in consumer finance over the past 
twenty-five years.  The availability of credit has expanded considerably, while 
the aggregate use of consumer and mortgage credit also continues to increase.  
But the downside of wider availability and use of consumer credit appears to 
be the related trend of dramatically higher rates of personal bankruptcy and 
credit losses to lenders.  How concerned should analysts be about the changes 
in the credit environment?  The authors argue that these consumer finance 
trends can be properly interpreted as a supply-side revolution in the provision 
of consumer credit.  Five elements of this revolution are outlined.  The 
implication is that higher bankruptcy rates and credit losses are likely to be a 
part of the landscape for the foreseeable future. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic commentators periodically remark on the long-term changes 
that have taken place in the landscape of consumer finance.  Compared to 
historical precedents, it seems that new ground is constantly being broken in 
terms of the levels of household debt, the types of households with access to 
credit, the types of credit available, and the terms under which credit is offered.  
Because new financial practices depart from familiar norms, concerns are often 
raised about how the new practices will affect consumers and lenders.  Does 
increased indebtedness mark progress in the nation’s financial development, or 
does it represent a dangerous increase in risk that could leave many consumers 
and their lenders in financial peril?  That seems to be the perpetual question on 
the minds of analysts and researchers in this area. 
Perhaps the most profound—and the most worrisome—trend of the past 
twenty-five years in consumer finance is the large secular increase in annual 
 
* The authors are Chief Economist and Senior Financial Economist, respectively, at the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in Washington, D.C.  This paper was presented at Saint Louis 
University on December 8, 2004 at the conference, “Consequences of the Consumer Lending 
Revolution.”  This paper represents the authors’ opinions and not necessarily those of the FDIC, 
its Directors, or other members of its staff. 
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personal bankruptcy filings.  The number of U.S. personal bankruptcy filings 
jumped from less than 350,000 in 1985 to almost 1.4 million in 1998, both 
years being well within U.S. economic expansions.1  Measured per thousand 
persons, the rate of personal bankruptcy filings nearly quadrupled, from 1.43 to 
5.17, during this interval.2  The implications are far-reaching.  During each of 
the past eight years, more than one million households have incurred the short-
term and long-term adverse consequences of a bankruptcy filing.3  Similarly, 
lenders have been forced to write off billions of dollars worth of unsecured 
consumer loan receivables each year, a substantial portion of which is owed by 
bankrupt households.4 
But exactly why this trend has occurred continues to be widely debated.  
Causes that have been advanced by various researchers fall into four classes: 1) 
economic and social factors, 2) legal factors, 3) consumer behavior and 
decision making, and 4) changes in financial practices that have resulted in a 
wider availability of consumer credit.  Each of these viewpoints has 
considerable literature supporting it, and it would be impossible to argue that 
each of these factors has not played some role in driving the increase in 
bankruptcy filings.  But correctly identifying the primary cause of the increase 
in personal bankruptcy filings has important implications for credit risk 
management as well as for public policy.  If the increase is the result of 
economic and/or social factors, it is likely that improvement in those 
 
 1. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, U.S. BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 1980–2003, at 
http://www.abiworld.org/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentID=13743.  There 
were 341,233 non-business filings in 1985 and 1,398,182 non-business filings in 1998.  Id.  The 
National Bureau of Economic Research dates U.S. business cycles.  The bureau determined that 
the economy was expanding between November 1982 and July 1990, and between March 1991 
and March 2001.  NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE EXPANSIONS 
AND CONTRACTIONS, at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited April 18, 
2005). 
 2. The population was 237,924,000 in July 1985 and 270,248,000 in July 1998.  U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, TOTAL MONTHLY POPULATION ESTIMATES, 1980 TO 2000, at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/nat-total.txt (last visited April 18, 2005).  The rate 
of personal bankruptcy filings per thousand population was 1.43 in 1985 and 5.17 in 1998.  These 
figures are derived by using non-business filings found at AMERICAN BANKING INSTITUTE, supra 
note 1. 
 3. See AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, supra note 1 (non-business filings have 
numbered more than one million each year since 1996). 
 4. Experts estimate that 40% of all credit card loan chargeoffs result directly from 
bankruptcy.  MARK FURLETTI, PAYMENT CARDS CENTER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
PHILADELPHIA, MEASURING CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY CHARGEOFFS: A REVIEW OF SOURCES 
AND METHODS 1, 3 (2003), at  http://www.phil.frb.org/pcc/discussion/measuring_chargeoffs.pdf 
(last visited April 18, 2005); The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony 
of Kenneth Beine, Presdient and CEO, Shoreline Credit Union), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3990. 
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conditions could reduce the bankruptcy rate.  If legal factors explain the rise in 
bankruptcies, then clearly the legal changes that caused the problem could be 
reversed.  Similarly, if the primary cause is a change in consumer behavior or 
decision-making, there is always the possibility that the behavior could change 
again (or even revert back to what it was before) and move the rate of 
bankruptcy filing back down.  However, we argue that the fourth category of 
factors—changes in financial practices leading to the wider availability of 
credit—is qualitatively different than the other three. Because these supply-
side factors relate mainly to new technologies and financial market practices, 
there is little reason to believe that the marketplace will reverse these 
developments absent the imposition of significant new regulation.  Therefore, 
if changes in financial market practices represent the primary cause behind the 
surge in bankruptcy filings, the resulting high-loss consumer credit 
environment could remain in place over the long run. 
We argue that the evidence does indeed point to changes in financial 
practices and a wider availability of household credit as the primary causes for 
the dramatic increase in U.S. personal bankruptcy filings over the past twenty-
five years.  These changes are outlined under what we call the five elements of 
the “consumer lending revolution.”  The implication of this conclusion is that 
the higher bankruptcy and loan loss environment of recent years may well 
persist for the foreseeable future.  If this is indeed the case, risk managers will 
have to continue to structure their models to anticipate high credit losses, while 
policymakers will need to carefully consider the welfare implications of these 
changes in the marketplace. 
II.  YARDSTICKS FOR THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 
It is not uncommon to read accounts in the popular press and by 
commentators of an impending day of reckoning for U.S. consumers.  These 
accounts often cite lagging income growth for lower-income Americans and 
excessive indebtedness for households all along the income spectrum.5  The 
source of concern in these accounts is often the fact that a familiar indicator for 
indebtedness, such as some absolute dollar amount of debt outstanding or some 
maximum ratio of debt to income, has been surmounted.  Certainly, 
developments in credit practices and borrowing habits have tended to change 
over time in a way that has led the gross amount of household debt to 
increase.6  But what yardsticks should be applied to assess these changes? 
 
 5. See, e.g., TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DEMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS 
MEET: THE GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ‘90s, 10, 12, 19, 21–22, 28–29 (2003), 
available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf; Daniel 
McGinn, Maxed Out!, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 34. 
 6. See, e.g., Governor Mark W. Olson, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks at the America’s 
Community Bankers 2003 National Compliance and Attorney’s Conference and Marketplace 
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This section outlines some basic measures of household income, 
indebtedness, credit use, and bankruptcy filings in an attempt to objectively 
define a set of yardsticks that can be used to evaluate the long-term changes 
taking place in household financial services.  We find that while it is hard to 
argue that U.S. households are becoming poorer over time, it is clear that by 
some measures they are becoming more indebted.  Moreover, the growth in 
household indebtedness is concentrated among lower-income households and 
other households that previously did not have access to consumer and 
mortgage credit.  Finally, we find that the incidence of household financial 
distress, as measured by per capita personal bankruptcy filings, has risen 
dramatically since the mid-1980s. 
A. U.S. Households Have, in General, Grown Richer—not Poorer—Over 
Time 
An initial yardstick for the financial well-being of households would 
simply be household income.  In Figure 1, we show that total disposable (after-
tax) personal incomes, adjusted for inflation and population growth, have 
grown steadily over the past forty years.  By 2003, real per capita disposable 
income had more than doubled from its 1960 level, representing an 
approximate doubling in the purchasing power of the average American.  The 
average compound annual increase in real per capita disposable incomes over 
this period was 1.9%.7  But even as U.S. disposable incomes have risen over 
time, household net worth has risen even faster—particularly after 1984.  
Figure 2 shows that despite a recent decline in household net worth resulting 
from the sharp drop in equity prices after 2000, total household net worth as of 
2003 remained at almost 538% of disposable income, compared to just 422% 
in 1984.  Adjusted for inflation, the average annual increase in household 
incomes since 1984 has been 2.4%, while household net worth has risen by an 
average of 3.7% annually. 
Still, these top-line numbers fail to express changes in the distribution of 
incomes and wealth that could convey a sense of financial distress among 
households.  There is ample evidence that the distribution of income has 
become more uneven over the past forty years. Figure 3 shows that the top 
20% of U.S. families raised their share of aggregate income from 41% to 48% 
between 1980 and 2001.  This increase in the share of national income came at 
the expense of every other income group, but primarily from the second and 
 
(Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030922/default.htm.  
See also, McGinn, supra note 5. 
 7. Calculation based on data from the Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table B. 100 
(Disposable Incomes); Bureau of Census, Current Population Survey (Total Resident Population); 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics (Consumer Price Index). 
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third quintiles, which lost share by 1.9 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively.8  
However, while the lower income quintiles lost in relative terms, they gained 
in absolute terms.  Adjusted for inflation, average compound annual growth in 
disposable income during this period ranged from 1.3% for those in the lowest 
income quintile to 3.2% for those in the highest quintile.  Thus, while higher 
income families may have seen greater gains in income, families all throughout 
the income distribution have enjoyed income growth in recent decades. 
Increases in family net worth have also been higher for households in the 
top fifth of the income distribution.  Data published by the Federal Reserve 
Board show that the total net worth of the U.S. household sector grew at a 
compound annual rate of 4.1% annually between 1992 and 2001.9  However, 
the top quintile of income earners saw their net worth rise by 7.1% annually 
compared to only 0.9% for the second quintile.10  Nonetheless, despite 
disparities in the rate of growth in wealth and incomes, the data clearly show a 
pattern of progress in the financial resources available to U.S. households 
across the income spectrum. 
B. U.S. Households Have Generally Grown More Indebted Over Time 
Time series data also show a consistent pattern of rising indebtedness 
among U.S. households that has accelerated since the mid-1980s.  Figure 4 
shows total mortgage and consumer debt owed by U.S. households as a percent 
of annual disposable income.11  The chart depicts a near doubling of the total 
ratio of household debt to income since 1960 (from 55% to 104%) with much 
of the gain having occurred since 1984.  Mortgage obligations led this twenty-
year increase in household debt.  While the ratio of consumer debt to 
disposable income has risen from 18% to 25% since 1984, the ratio of 
mortgage debt to income has risen from 42% to 80%.  Furthermore, there has 
been a clear substitution of revolving credit (mostly made up of credit card 
lines) for nonrevolving debt (including car loans and other loans secured by 
 
 8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES – FAMILIES, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f02.html. 
 9. Total household sector net worth is derived from Table B.100, FEDERAL RESERVE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, Tbl. B.100 
(March 10, 2005) [hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/z1/current/default.htm (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 10. Median family net worth by income quintile is derived from Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., 
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 1, 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 2003). 
 11. Mortgage debt includes all debt owed by households that is secured by residential 
properties.  BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS 436–37 (3d ed. 2000).  Consumer 
credit, used generically, refers to debt secured by cars, boats, and other assets other than 
residential real estate, plus unsecured personal loans and lines of credit, including credit card 
receivables.  See Consumer Credit, at http://www.investorwords.com/1056/consumer_credit.html 
(last visited April 18, 2005). 
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assets other than residential real estate).  Since 1980, revolving loans have 
more than doubled as a share of total consumer credit outstanding, from 16% 
to 38%. 
In part, the increase in mortgage indebtedness and the rise in revolving 
credit reflect what has been called the “democratization” of consumer credit.12  
Liberalization of lending standards and new programs to extend credit to new 
classes of household borrowers have resulted in an expansion in the percent of 
households that hold credit cards as well as an increase in the percent of 
households that own their own home.13  There were two additional reasons that 
homeowner households may have wanted to shift towards the use of mortgage 
debt since the mid-1980s.  One was the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
removed the deductibility of interest paid on consumer debt.14  After 1986, 
mortgage indebtedness was clearly a tax-preferred source of borrowing for 
households that itemized their tax deductions.15  At the same time, fixed 
conventional mortgage rates were undergoing a large, long-run decline from an 
average of 12.4% in 1985 to an average of 5.8% in 2003.16  As the price of 
mortgage debt declined in both absolute terms and relative terms when 
compared to other forms of household debt on an after-tax basis, it was natural 
that households would choose to shift their borrowing toward mortgage 
products. 
The shift towards mortgage debt and the decline in mortgage interest rates 
has helped keep total household monthly debt service payments at levels 
comparable to their historical levels, despite a large increase in total 
 
 12. The phrase “democratization of consumer credit” has been widely attributed to former 
Federal Reserve Board member Lawrence Lindsey.  Olson, supra note 6. 
 13. DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 5, at 33–34, 37; McGinn, supra note 5, at 36–37.  The 
Bureau of the Census reports that the rate of U.S. home ownership rose from 64% in 1994 to 68% 
in 2003, reflecting the addition of 11.5 million additional new homeowner households over this 
period.  Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual 
Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ boarddocs/speeches/ 
2004/20040521/default.htm tbl.1, tbl.2 (citing the source of the data in Table 1 as MORTGAGE 
STATISTICAL ANNUAL (March 2004), and citing the source of the data in Table 2 as the U.S. 
Census Bureau).  Similarly, the percent of households holding at least one credit card has been 
estimated to have increased from 64% in 1983 to 75% in 1995.  Peter S. Yoo, Still Charging: The 
Growth of Credit Debt Between 1992 and 1995, REVIEW, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 19, 21 tbl.2, 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/98/01/9801py.pdf. 
 14. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (1988).  See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FACT 
SHEET: TAXES: HISTORY OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM, available at http://www.treas.gov/education/ 
fact-sheets/taxes/ustax.shtml. 
 15. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) for information on personal interest deductions available for 
home acquisition and home equity indebtedness. 
 16. FREDDIE MAC, 30-YEAR FIXED-RATE MORTGAGES SINCE 1971, at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited April 18, 2005).  The total decline 
in mortgage rates between 1985 and 2003 would have been enough to reduce the monthly 
principal and interest payment on a $100,000 thirty-year conventional loan from $1,060 to $587. 
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indebtedness.  Figure 5 depicts the average total monthly debt service 
obligations of homeowners (including both their consumer debt and their 
mortgage debt with related insurance and tax obligations) since 1980.  The 
chart shows that the monthly financial obligations of U.S. homeowners have 
risen only modestly over the past twenty-five years.  Monthly financial 
obligations have increased by only about 2% of income since 1980, even as the 
amount of mortgage and consumer debt owed by households has 
approximately tripled over that interval.  So despite a large increase in the 
indebtedness of U.S. households over the past twenty years, the monthly 
payments required to service that debt have not, in aggregate, greatly outpaced 
growth in incomes. 
C. Credit is Being Increasingly Extended to New Classes of Household 
Borrowers 
We have described above how the total indebtedness of U.S. households 
has risen dramatically over time even as the monthly cost of servicing that debt 
has risen only modestly. But as was the case with the income and wealth data, 
it may be misleading to look at the growth in indebtedness in aggregate terms 
alone.  Beneath the figures for total growth in household indebtedness, we see 
signs that access to credit and total indebtedness is rising fastest for households 
in the lowest income strata.  For example, only 26% of households in the 
lowest income quintile held credit cards in 1983, compared to 94% of 
households in the highest quintile.17  But by 1995, the percentage of credit card 
holders had increased to 38% of households in the lowest quintile (an increase 
of almost one-third), versus 98% of households in the top quintile.18 
New classes of borrowers also have begun to make use of more mortgage 
debt.  The expansion of mortgage indebtedness downward through the income 
distribution was accompanied by a climbing homeownership rate.  Both were 
fueled, in turn, by the introduction and rapid growth of subprime lending in the 
1990s.19  “Subprime” is the term applied to borrowers who cannot qualify for 
“prime” conventional mortgages because of blemished or limited credit 
histories.20  Because these are riskier borrowers, they were generally denied 
credit under more traditional lending models.  However, annual originations of 
subprime mortgages rose nearly ten-fold between 1994 and 2003, when $332 
 
 17. Yoo, supra note 13, at 21 tbl.2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2004 16 (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/ 
markets/son2004.pdf.  See also Gramlich, supra note 13. 
 20. Kathy R. Kalser & Debra L. Novak, Subprime Lending: A Time For Caution, FDIC 
REGIONAL OUTLOOK 3, 4 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ 
ro19973q/pdf/roa19973.pdf. 
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billion subprime mortgages were closed.21  Note that while subprime loans 
tend to make up a higher percentage of loans to lower-income borrowers than 
to higher-income borrowers, this is not exclusively the case.22 
Overall, the expanding use of credit cards and other types of credit 
instruments by new segments of the population means that households now 
face fewer liquidity constraints.  While all households have been finding it 
easier to secure the total amount of money that they wish to borrow, 
historically credit-constrained households, such as black households and low-
income households, have enjoyed particularly large gains in credit access.  
Research demonstrates that the difference between desired borrowings and 
actual borrowings, termed the “borrowing gap,” declined by nearly 13% 
overall between 1983 and 1998.23  Some groups of households saw much more 
appreciative reductions in this gap than others.  Households with incomes 
below $25,000 and between $25,000 and $49,999 saw reductions of 14% and 
23%, respectively.24  This means that while the lowest income households, 
those with income levels below $25,000, were only able to obtain 48% of the 
amount of debt that they desired in 1983, by 1998 they could get nearly 62% of 
the total money they wished to borrow.25  In contrast, the borrowing gap rose 
by only 2% for households with income level between $50,000 and $99,999.26  
Similarly, access to credit was increased more substantially for black 
households than for white households; the borrowing gap reductions were 17% 
and 13%, respectively.27 
But the opportunity to borrow large amounts of money can leave low-
income households with particularly high debt service burdens.  In the past, 
families in the lowest income quintiles have been shown to have the highest 
debt burdens of any income group.28  Moreover, there are indications that the 
debt service burdens of lower-income households rose faster than those of 
other households during the 1990s.  Data from the Federal Reserve Survey of 
Consumer Finances show that the percent of families who devoted more than 
40% of income to debt service rose between 1989 and 1998 for households 
across the income spectrum; however, the largest increases took place among 
households with incomes between $10,000 and $25,000 (rising from 15% to 
 
 21. Gramlich, supra note 13 (citing MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL (2004)). 
 22. See. id.  Governor Gramlich presents data showing that subprime mortgages made up 9% 
of purchase mortgage loans made in 2002 to borrowers who earned at least 120% of the median 
family income in their metropolitan area. Id. 
 23. Angela C. Lyons, How Credit Access has Changed Over Time for U.S. Households, 37 J. 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 231, 248 tbl.6 (2003). 
 24. Id. at 249 tbl.7. 
 25. Id. at 249. 
 26. Id. at 250. 
 27. Id. at 251 tbl.9. 
 28. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 10, at 28 tbl.14. 
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almost 20%) and those with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 (rising 
from 9.1% to 13.8%).29 
D. A Dramatic Rise in Personal Bankruptcy Filings Demonstrates a Rising 
Incidence of Serious Financial Distress 
The most striking change in consumer finances over the past twenty-five 
years has been the tremendous increase in U.S. personal bankruptcy filings.  
Figure 6 shows that per capita non-business bankruptcy filings quadrupled 
between 1985 and 1998 to approximately 5.0 per thousand population.30  The 
total number of non-business bankruptcy filings rose during this period from 
less than 350,000 to more than 1.3 million per year.31 
Importantly, the rise in personal bankruptcy filings took place in a fairly 
uniform manner across the nation.  In 1998, as in 1985, there were marked 
differences across the states in terms of the ratio of personal bankruptcy filings 
per thousand population.  For example, in both 1985 and 1998 the states of 
Tennessee, Alabama, Nevada and Georgia represented four of the five states 
with the highest rates of personal bankruptcy filings per capita.  Similarly, six 
of the ten states with the lowest bankruptcy filing rates in 1985 continued to 
enjoy that distinction in 1998.32  The state with the highest bankruptcy filing 
rate in both periods (Tennessee) saw its ratio increase 3.3 times while the ratio 
for the entire U.S. rose by a factor of 4.0.33  The relative uniformity of the 
increases measured across the U.S. strongly suggests the influence of factors 
operating at a national level over time.  The following section evaluates 
various factors that have been suggested as causes for the large increase in 
personal bankruptcy filings during this period. 
 
 29. Arthur B. Kennickell et. al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 25 tbl.14, 26 (Jan. 2000), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0100lead.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 31. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, supra note 1. 
 32. See supra notes 1–2.  The six states that ranked among the ten lowest bankruptcy filing 
rates in both 1985 and 1998 were Alaska, Massachusetts, Maine, South Dakota, and Vermont. 
 33. Based on bankruptcy data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court and 
population data from the Bureau of the Census. 
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III.  EXPLANATIONS OFFERED FOR THE INCREASE IN PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 
FILINGS 
The reasons for rising bankruptcies can be grouped into four general areas: 
1) economic and social factors, 2) legal factors, 3) consumer behavior and 
decision making, and 4) a wider availability of consumer credit.  To generally 
characterize these causes, it can be said that the first two relate to exogenous 
factors, the third relates to cognitive challenges on the part of borrowers, and 
the fourth relates to technical progress in the provision of consumer credit. 
Researchers have examined each of these explanations; some of their most 
notable studies are summarized below. 
A. Economic and Social Factors 
The role of economic and social factors as the proximate causes of 
personal bankruptcy has been well documented.  These are circumstances from 
outside of the household that can affect family finances or the propensity to 
borrow.  It is certainly reasonable to hypothesize that economic and labor 
market conditions, as well as prevailing social conventions, will influence an 
individual’s tendency to file bankruptcy. 
Any type of increase in financial distress can result in bankruptcy.  For 
example, the national employment situation is clearly linked to many 
borrowers’ abilities to maintain income and meet their financial obligations.  
Employment related income interruption is such an important trigger event that 
up to 68% of bankruptcy filings involve a “job problem” during the two years 
before the filing.34  Escalating medical costs also have been shown to trigger 
bankruptcy in a large number of individual cases; a recent survey shows that as 
many as one half of all bankruptcies may be the result of mounting medical 
bills or other health-related costs.35  Divorce is another often-cited reason for 
bankruptcy since it frequently results in income interruption.36  Increased 
reliance on debt can prove to be problematic as well.  Recent research argues 
that the expansion in the use of credit card debt is “a way to fill the growing 
gap between household earnings and the cost of essential goods and services,” 
implying a deepening financial vulnerability.37 
 
 34. Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 127 (2003). 
 35. David U. Himmelstein et al., Market Watch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS Feb. 2, 2005 at W5-63, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ 
full/hlthaff.w5.63/DC1 (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 36. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN 
DEBT 197 (2000); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: 
WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003). 
 37. DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 5, at 9. 
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In their popular and much-discussed book, The Two-Income Trap, 
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi expand the trigger event argument 
to incorporate social factors along with economic circumstances.38  Their 
writings suggest that societal pressures to have the “right” house in the “right” 
neighborhood and the “right” school district lead families to commit 
increasingly greater portions of their income to mortgage and consumer debt as 
they stretch to reach these goals.39  They describe a new set of social norms 
that could leave household balances sheets weaker and make families even 
more susceptible to economic trigger events. 
Another social issue that contributes to bankruptcy is gambling.  A study 
by the National Gambling Commission found that 19% of pathological 
gamblers file bankruptcy, compared to 5.5% of low-risk gamblers and 4.2% of 
non-gamblers.40  Meanwhile, expenditures on gambling increased rapidly 
during recent decades.  Gambling in many forms is much more common today 
than it was twenty-five years ago; for instance, lottery sales per capita rose 
from $35 in 1973 to $150 in 1997, and tribal gambling revenues jumped from 
$212 million in 1988 to $6.7 billion in 1997.41  Social acceptance of these and 
other gambling activities makes it easier for individuals to participate in 
gambling, which ultimately can lead to financial hardship for some. 
While economic and social factors clearly impact individual filing 
decisions, the case for these causes as drivers of the large time series increase 
in bankruptcy filings is not as well established.  Consider that during the period 
of the steepest increase in bankruptcy filings, the aggregate U.S. 
unemployment rate and divorce rate were both in decline.42  Specifically, 
although the bankruptcy filing rate more than quadrupled between 1985 and 
1998, the unemployment rate in 1998 (4.5%) was lower than the rate for 1985 
(7.2%), as was the rate for each of the twelve years in between.43  Moreover, 
although medical costs certainly rose during that period (the medical cost 
consumer price index more than doubled),44 the increase was offset by a rise in 
 
 38. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 36, at 80–81. 
 39. Id. at 20–21, 28. 
 40. NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 7-16 (1999), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 41. Id. at 2-1, 2-9. 
 42. Todd Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 39–48 
(George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-35, 2004) (forthcoming 2005, NW. U. 
L. REV), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=587901. 
 43. Supra note 2 and accompanying text; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940 TO DATE, http://www.bls.gov/ 
cps/cpsaat1.pdf. 
 44. The seasonally-adjusted consumer price index for medical care rose from 113.5 in 1985 
to 242.1 in 1998.  Economic Report of the President: 2000 Report Spreadsheet Tables, Table B–
58: Consumer Price Indexes for Major Expenditure Classes, 1958–99, at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy01/sheets/b_58xls (last visited April 18, 2005). 
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income and a decline in the price of other goods.  Overall, then, such factors 
seem not to have left families worse off.45  The suggestion that the gap 
between the costs of goods and family incomes is also inconsistent with the 
data; recall that inflation adjusted incomes and net worth have been climbing 
for every income group, especially since the mid 1980s.  In fact, some research 
suggests that, paradoxically, wealth gains themselves may be a factor 
contributing to credit quality problems.  Because rising net worth drives up 
demand for credit, it was perhaps increases, not decreases, in wealth that 
accounted for mounting indebtedness and higher defaults during the past two 
decades.46  The implication is that weak economic conditions may not have 
precipitated the surge in bankruptcy filings. 
Other analysts concur that economic and social factors on their own are 
insufficient to explain the growth in personal bankruptcies.  David Gross and 
Nicholas Souleles estimate a credit card default model that controls for the risk 
of borrowers and economic fundamentals.  The model finds that after 
controlling for these factors, the propensity to default rose markedly during the 
1995–1997 period.47  The results suggest the presence of a time-varying 
default factor that is not captured in the model, or any models of this sort.48  
Paul Bishop made a similar finding with respect to the existence of a time 
varying factor that was pushing the bankruptcy rate to higher levels over time 
that standard models could explain.  His basic model found that 69% of the 
time-series variation in the bankruptcy filing rate between 1960 and 1996 
could be explained in terms of economic variables, changes in the aggregate 
consumer and mortgage debt service burdens of the household sector and job 
growth.49  However, after splitting the sample for the model and conducting an 
out-of-sample test for the period 1986–1996 (when bankruptcy filing rate more 
than tripled) the model began to significantly underpredict the bankruptcy rate 
after 1991.50  By 1996, the model was underpredicting the bankruptcy rate by 
40%.51  A related paper shows that the rank order of state filing rates was 
invariant over the 1980s and early 1990s, even during that period’s rolling 
regional recession, which might have been expected to play a large role in 
 
 45. Supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (documenting the rise in income and net worth 
seen by U.S. households in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 46. Donald P. Morgan & Ian Toll, Bad Debt Rising, 3 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 4 
(1997), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci3-4.pdf. 
 47. DAVID B. GROSS & NICHOLAS S. SOULELES, THE WHARTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
CENTER, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY AND DELINQUENCY 5, available 
at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/98/9828.pdf. 
 48. See id. 
 49. PAUL C. BISHOP, DIVISION OF INSURANCE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, BANK TRENDS, A TIME SERIES MODEL OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY RATES 6 tbl.4 
(1998), at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9801.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 7. 
 51. Id. 
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bankruptcy filings.52  While there is evidence of the recessions’ economic 
effects when state differences and the U.S. trend are controlled for, these 
effects are extremely weak.53 
Throughout the literature, these types of models convey a sense of 
structural change in the relationship between risk factors, economic factors, 
and the rate of bankruptcy filings during the mid 1990s.  If economic changes 
themselves are not the root cause of the upswing in filings, the question 
remains however as to whether this structural change can best be explained by 
legal factors, behavioral change or a wider availability of credit 
B. Legal Factors 
The legal environment has been given special consideration as an 
important driver behind the change in filing rates.  One reason legal factors 
have been advanced as a possible cause is that federal asset exemptions were 
established in 1978 and expanded in 1994.54  However, more than two-thirds 
of states opted out of the federal exemptions and established their own 
exemptions that were higher or lower than the federal limits.55  Beyond asset 
exemptions, it is not clear that there were significant enough changes in the 
legal environment to explain the large upsurge in filings between 1985 and 
1998. 
Researchers agree that legal stipulations such as asset exemptions, wage 
garnishment, nonjudicial foreclosure, and auto insurance requirements can 
affect the incentive of debtors to seek bankruptcy protection and the economic 
benefits of doing so.56  This is important in explaining the differences in filing 
rates across states.  However, researchers have failed to find a systematic case 
for legal factors in the steep ascent of bankruptcy filings nationwide.  Wage 
garnishment is the one factor that appears to be most closely related to higher 
 
 52. RICHARD A BROWN, DIVISION OF INSURANCE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, BANK TRENDS, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF STATE-LEVEL PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY RATES, 1970–1996 4–5 (1998), at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/ 
bt_9802.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005).  Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma experienced an 
economic boom in the early 1980s followed by a several year downturn in the mid 1980s; 
Indiana, Ohio and Michigan suffered dual recessions between 1980 and 1982 followed by more 
prosperous times in the mid 1990s; and New England experienced an economic boom in the late 
1980s followed by a downturn in the early 1990s.  Id. at 4–5 chts.5–8. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. DIANE ELLIS, DIVISION OF INSURANCE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
BANK TRENDS, THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL FACTORS ON PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 2, 3 
(1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9803.pdf (last visited April 18, 
2005). 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. See Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. 
ECON. 217, 220, 222 (1997); ELLIS, supra note 54, at 3. 
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state filing rates.57  But while differences in state provisions may help explain 
why relative state filing rates have remained stable, over time there is no 
evidence that systematic changes in wage garnishment laws have driven up 
filing rates across the country. 
Some papers look at differences in bankruptcy filings across states as a 
function of differences in state law.  Although in selected cases legal 
influences do explain the difference between individual state rates, the 
differences do not appear to be systematic.58  One important reason is that 
lenders can alter the availability of credit in response to any change in legal 
protections enjoyed by borrowers in various states and will simply constrain 
credit in areas where bankruptcy law is too consumer-friendly.59 
Canadian data provide further evidence that legal factors are not 
instrumental in changing bankruptcy patterns.  Canada’s personal bankruptcy 
rate rose largely in step with the U.S. filing rate after 1978, when U.S. interest 
rates were effectively deregulated.60  Both countries were operating in similar 
economic and interest rate environments, but the U.S. saw significant 
bankruptcy law reform while Canadian law was essentially unchanged.61  The 
legal changes in the U.S. may not have been the primary reason for the rise in 
bankruptcies, since Canadian bankruptcies increased similarly, even in the 
absence of legal reform.62 
C. Consumer Behavior and Decision Making 
Another branch of the literature looks to possible changes in consumer 
decision-making as an explanation for higher bankruptcy filings.  One of the 
most prominent researchers along these lines, Lawrence Ausubel, argues that 
the credit card market is uncompetitive and that lenders with market power can 
make credit available on less favorable terms for some consumers.63  However, 
he also asserts that borrowers will only agree to such terms if they 
underestimate the chance that they will carry balances and actually be 
 
 57. ELLIS, supra note 54, at 4–6, 9; Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal 
Bankruptcy at 3, 8 (2002), available at http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/informal-
bankruptcy.pdf. 
 58. See ELLIS, supra note 54, at 9; Gropp et al., supra note 56, at 227. 
 59. Mark M. Zandi, Easy Credit, Profligate Borrowing, Tough Lessons, REG’L FIN. REV., 
Jan. 1997, at 16, 19. Cf. Gropp et al., supra note 56, at 232, 234. 
 60. DIANE ELLIS, DIVISION OF INSURANCE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
BANK TRENDS, THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER INTEREST RATE DEREGULATION ON CREDIT CARD 
VOLUMES, CHARGE-OFFS, AND THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY RATE 5, 10 (1998), at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005); Zandi supra 
note 60 at 16. 
 61. ELLIS, supra note 60, at 10; Zandi supra note 60, at 16. 
 62. ELLIS, supra note 60, at 10; Zandi supra note 60, at 16. 
 63. Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 50, 69–71 (1991). 
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subjected to interest rates and other charges.64  Thus consumer irrationality is a 
fundamental factor in Ausubel’s theory of debt use and bankruptcy.65 
Limitations on borrowers’ cognitive decision-making abilities are cited by 
a number of other researchers as well.  One line that follows Ausubel’s 
argument is termed by Richard Hynes the “over optimism hypothesis.”66  This 
refers to the tendency of uninformed consumers to borrow more than they 
would have had they properly understood the risks and costs.67  Similarly, 
households may take on more debt than they know is wise as an extreme 
reaction to economic or social distress.68  The consumers’ choice to use credit 
can also be unduly influenced by media blitzes and peer pressure; debt taken 
on under these circumstances may be marked by denial and regret and is not 
seen as the result of reasoned decision-making.69  Still, sometimes suboptimal 
decisions can lead some consumers to borrow too little, not too much.  For 
instance, Hynes’ discussion of the over optimism theory argues that such 
optimism can conceivably lead consumers to borrow less than they otherwise 
would.70  Thus, irrationality can work both to increase and decrease 
borrowings and the ultimate influence is unclear. 
Finally, there is the concept of stigma as it relates to consumer behavior.  It 
has long been argued that the social stigma associated with bankruptcy has 
eased in recent decades, becoming a much less important factor in households’ 
decisions to file.  Even the Federal Reserve cites its changing influence.71  
Perhaps social stigma is the unidentified “Factor X” suggested by Bishop and 
Gross and Souleles.72  One reason that the propensity to default has risen, even 
after controlling for economic factors, is that borrowers perceive that the cost 
of default has fallen.  This could conceivably have come about because the 
social stigma associated with bankruptcy declined during the period.  
 
 64. Id. at 76. 
 65. Id. at 71–72, 76. 
 66. Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. REV. 127, 131 
(2004). 
 67. Id. at 135. 
 68. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.  See also WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 
36, at 130–32. 
 69. ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S 
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 8-11 (2001); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 133, 135–37. 
 70. Hynes, supra note 66, at 145. 
 71. Govenor Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks at the Economic Growth and Regulatory 
Paperwork Reduction Act Banker Outreach Meeting, (April 22, 2004), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040422/default.htm.  Governor Bies 
said, “The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 made bankruptcy a more attractive option for most 
households by increasing the amount of wealth that households could retain after bankruptcy.  
Other factors that have likely contributed to the upward trend are the decrease in the social stigma 
of filing for bankruptcy and the growing access to credit in the United States.”  Id. 
 72. See BISHOP, supra note 49, at 1; Gross & Souleles, supra note 47, at 1. 
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However, some researchers contend that stigma is still prevalent, weighing on 
household decisions.73  Embarrassment continues to make filers reluctant to 
admit what they have done.  When surveyed, only half of those who have filed 
for bankruptcy acknowledge that they have done so.74  Filing bankruptcy is a 
difficult choice with unpleasant emotional and financial consequences.75  And 
while post-bankruptcy credit may be available to filers sooner today than it 
was in the past, thanks to subprime lenders, it is relatively expensive, so there 
is still a financial cost exacted on bankrupt households for years after filing 
occurs. 
It is particularly difficult to evaluate arguments related to decision 
processes and stigma because they are not easily quantified.  It is important to 
note that even if such factors have shaped bankruptcy trends to date, consumer 
behavior could change again at any point in the future and could even revert to 
older ways.  Thus, it could be ineffective to base policy recommendations 
simply on the basis of changing consumer behavior. 
D. Wider Availability of Credit 
Lastly, several researchers have attributed the changes in consumer credit 
performance directly to the expansion in credit availability.  The explanation is 
that credit card issuers changed their practices, relaxed their standards and 
extended credit to more and riskier borrowers during recent decades, ultimately 
leading to the surge in bankruptcy filings.76  As usury ceilings and other 
restrictions on lenders’ pricing powers were eliminated, lenders gained a new 
ability to raise risk premia and could afford to offer credit to riskier, potentially 
more costly borrowers.  Because this means that borrowers were more 
numerous and had a greater probability of defaulting on their obligations, the 
expansion of credit is a sufficient condition for a rise in bankruptcy rates.77 
Low-income consumers formed a large part of the group of new 
borrowers.  Indeed, the survey of consumer finances documents that while the 
number of low-income borrowers fell between 1983 and 1992, their aggregate 
debt rose as creditors granted them new access to credit.78  At the same time, 
mortgage and home equity lending were increasing, contributing to an adverse 
selection problem for unsecured credit card lenders.79  The less risky borrowers 
 
 73. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 32–34. 
 74. Himmelstein et al., supra note 35, at W5-64. 
 75. See for example, SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 32–34. 
 76. Joanna Stavins, Credit Card Borrowing, Delinquency, and Personal Bankruptcy, NEW 
ENG. ECON. REV., July–August 2000 at 15, 30, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ 
neer/neer2000/neer400b.pdf. 
 77. ELLIS, supra note 60, at 1. 
 78. David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, 
Revolution or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 311, 334 tbl.1 (1999). 
 79. Moss & Johnson, supra note 78, at 340 & n.112. 
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were better positioned to pledge their homes and take advantage of new 
mortgage industry innovations, leaving unsecured consumer lenders with a 
worse pool of credits from which to draw.  Credit card and similar lenders had 
no choice but to turn towards new classes of borrowers.  The resulting 
redistribution of credit, especially unsecured debt, towards lower income 
groups has been set forth as an important contributor to the rise in personal 
bankruptcy.80 
There is little doubt that the statistical case for wider availability of credit 
as the cause of the surge in bankruptcies is circumstantial.  The dramatic 
changes in the consumer finance environment and upswing in personal 
bankruptcy filings can be regarded as a one-time nationwide experiment.  
While we can, in selected cases, compare to other countries, such as Canada,81 
we cannot run a controlled time series experiment, thus we must rely on other 
analytics to dissect the root causes.  Researchers have hypothesized about 
economic and social factors, the legal environment, consumer behavior, and 
credit availability, and we have considered each in turn.  We have argued 
against economic and social factors because they leave too much of the trends 
in bankruptcy data unexplained.  Legal factors explain differences across 
states—which are important—but do not appear to explain the large national 
upward surge in filings.  Mass changes in behavior or a reduction in stigma 
cannot be ruled in or out, but the inability to quantify or measure these factors 
leaves these theories in this area to rely largely on conjecture.  That leaves the 
circumstantial link between an expansion in credit to lower-income and riskier 
households and the surge in bankruptcy filings.  We conclude that this is the 
best case.  We expand by outlining the regulatory and technological elements 
of what we see as the consumer lending revolution. 
IV.  ELEMENTS OF THE SUPPLY SIDE REVOLUTION 
A number of trends coalesced during the 1990s and profoundly altered the 
consumer lending environment.  These important institutional changes were 
deregulation, the rise of the general-purpose credit card, credit scoring, risk-
based pricing, and securitization.82  Together, these factors provide the 
economic rationale for the supply side revolution.  These forces have widely 
expanded the availability of credit and given consumers unprecedented 
command over economic resources.  However, these trends also have 
contributed to the historic increases in personal bankruptcy filings and 
 
 80. Id. at 340. 
 81. See ELLIS, supra note 60, at 1, 9; Zandi, supra note 60, at 16. 
 82. For a basic introduction to the elements of the consumer lending revolution, see SUSAN 
BURHOUSE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FYI: EVALUATING THE CONSUMER 
LENDING REVOLUTION (2003), at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/091703fyi.html 
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consumer loan losses seen in recent years.  In many ways, the supply side 
revolution has brought about a riskier consumer lending environment.  While 
the potential profits for lenders are high, the losses may be high too, raising the 
importance of adequate risk management practices.  In order to benefit from 
this revolution while minimizing its downside, consumers, lenders and 
policymakers must each consider the factors that have contributed to the new 
environment. 
A. Deregulation 
The banking industry has undergone significant competitive deregulation 
during the past thirty years.  Indeed, the financial services industry was 
affected by more legislative and regulatory changes in the period between 1980 
and 1994 than at any other time since the 1930s.83  These measures included 
provisions to relax branching restrictions, to permit banks to make new 
investments and engage in new activities and to loosen restrictions on interest 
rates paid on both deposits and loans. 
While each of these changes was important in redefining the business of 
banking, it was interest rate deregulation that most directly precipitated the 
supply side consumer lending revolution.  In the 1970s and early 1980s 
nominal interest rates were high and volatile, and inflation was increasing.84  
This made state usury ceilings binding, and ultimately provided the rationale 
for deregulation.  Because banks’ ability to raise the interest rates charged on 
loans was limited by usury ceilings, it was very costly for banks to run 
nationwide operations.85  The environment was so restrictive that thirty-seven 
states had some kind of ceiling on credit card interest charges by the end of the 
1970s.86  Consequently, overall credit card lender earnings declined, as many 
lenders suffered outright losses.87  Lenders had incentives to grant credit only 
to high-income, low-risk customers that offered stable banking relationships.  
Lenders needed the ability to charge higher interest rates to compensate for this 
risk of lending to a broader spectrum of borrowers. 
 
 83. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, HISTORY OF THE 80’S — LESSONS FOR 
THE FUTURE, VOLUME I: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISIS OF THE BANKING CRISIS OF 
THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 87 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/ 
history/87_136.pdf. 
 84. Historical interest rate data are available from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve.  FEDERAL RESERVE, SELECTED INTEREST RATES tbl.H.15, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm.  Data on inflation, as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Labor at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. 
 85. ELLIS, supra note 60, at 4–5. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
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The landscape changed dramatically in 1978, when a Supreme Court ruling 
in the case of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service 
Corp. (“Marquette”) effectively eliminated state usury ceilings on consumer 
loans.88  This was undoubtedly a landmark development, permitting rates to be 
governed by laws prevailing in the lender’s home state, regardless of the 
residency of the borrower.89  Some states, like South Dakota90 and Delaware,91 
relaxed their usury limits almost immediately to attract banking business.  
Banks and consumer lenders who were located in states with liberal rules could 
now export their rates to consumers in other states with more restrictive usury 
laws. 
The implications were particularly significant for credit card lenders, since 
the credit card business could be accomplished entirely by mail and did not 
require the borrower and lender to live in close proximity to one another or to 
have face-to-face meetings.  High interest rates were essential to this type of 
remote business model.  Lenders were taking on more risk by doing business 
with consumers who they knew little about, and needed to price products 
accordingly.  Once lenders were granted the ability to charge appropriate 
interest rates, the credit card by mail business model flourished.  Indeed, 
Citibank was one large national bank, which quickly moved its operations and 
set up credit card processing centers in the deregulated states.92  Other states 
were then pressured to relax their own usury laws for fear that major banks 
would move their business out of states that maintained strict limits.93  The 
changed regulatory environment allowed banks to expand their credit card 
lines of business through the 1980s, and credit card receivables increased by 
nearly five-fold over that decade.94  Consumer and credit card loans were not 
the only product lines affected by deregulatory forces.  The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 (“DIDA”) deregulated mortgage rates by 
eliminating state maximums for residential real estate loans.95 
In addition to eliminating the cap on loan rates, the trend toward 
deregulation also touched the other side of the balance sheet by removing the 
 
 88. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 
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limit on deposit rates that a bank could pay.96  Another provision of DIDA was 
to phase out deposit rate ceilings.97  Prior to that time, Regulation Q mandated 
the maximum rate that banks and thrifts could offer on deposit accounts.98  
This had effectively stifled competition and made it difficult for banks to raise 
funds when they were most needed.  Now banks can attract deposits in all 
credit environments, reducing the likelihood of a credit crunch in high interest 
rate periods. 
In many ways, deregulation has resulted in a more competitive banking 
environment.  The removal of deposit rate regulation and the subsequent 
creation of other competing deposit-like investments that paid market interest 
rates led banks to pay market rates on their deposits as well.  This was a costly 
change for banks, which lost their monopsony power in the deposit market and 
were no longer able to acquire funds at below market prices.99  In 1979 banks 
had enjoyed interest expenses that were 5.48 percentage points less than the 
average one-year Treasury rate for that year.100  By the time interest rate 
deregulation was complete in 1986, bank interest expenses were only 1.32 
percentage points below the Treasury rate.101  In addition, as some of the legal 
distinctions between banking activities and other types of commerce have been 
erased, banks have faced increasing competition from nonbank entities.  
Overall, the unregulated banking environment is characterized by both 
competition and consolidation, as fewer, larger banks have emerged to 
dominate the industry battle over new customers.  Credit card lending under 
deregulation offered the potential for high fees and high margins, helping 
banks cope with a suddenly much more competitive business environment. 
B. The General Purpose Credit Card 
Credit card lenders were among the first to react to deregulated consumer 
interest rates and extend new offerings to consumers with potentially riskier 
borrower profiles.102  Thus, the credit card instrument itself can be considered 
another important element of the changing consumer credit landscape.  The 
novelty of the credit card is that it can be used at any time, for any purpose, 
giving consumers great flexibility and autonomy over their purchasing and 
borrowing and contributing to profound changes in the psychology of 
consumer spending.  The introduction of unsecured, revolving credit meant 
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 98. Regulation Q: Prohibition Against the Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 12 
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that consumers no longer had to rely on personal loans, retail installment loans, 
or layaway plans to make specific purchases.  It also meant that lenders would 
have no assets to repossess in a default, just losses to charge off.  The rapid 
increase in debt use since the introduction of the credit card has had both costs 
and benefits for consumers and lenders, which must be thoroughly understood 
when analyzing the risks associated with revolving credit. 
The rapid growth in credit card lending began with the Marquette decision 
and continues today.  One indication of the pervasiveness of credit cards in 
today’s society is the frequency of credit card solicitations; consumers received 
nearly 4.3 billion solicitations per household in the mail in 2003, nearly four 
times more than households received in 1990.103  Although the number of 
offers has moderated somewhat after peaking at five billion in 2001, experts 
are projecting a record high number of mailings in 2004.104  Concurrent with 
the proliferation of credit card offers, the percent of families holding bank 
credit cards increased across all income groups during the 1990s, meaning that 
more and more families obtained access to unsecured, revolving credit lines.105  
The increase was especially pronounced for lower income households.  In 
2001, 44% of families in the lowest income quintile had at least one bank 
credit card, up from 30% in 1989, while the percentage of households in the 
second income quintile that carried one or more bank credit cards climbed to 
70% from 56% over the same period.106  Not surprisingly, increasing access to 
this type of credit has brought about increases in utilization of credit, a change 
that is again especially pronounced for families in lower income brackets.  The 
percent of families in the lowest income quintile holding credit card debt 
doubled from 15% to 30% between 1989 and 2001, while households in the 
highest two income quintiles actually became less likely to carry outstanding 
balances.107 
Not only low-income borrowers, but also younger, less wealthy, and other 
higher credit risk consumers are benefiting from this important lending option.  
The mix of credit card holders has changed in recent years to include 
borrowers that have higher debt to income ratios, work in low-skilled jobs, are 
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single, are renters, have less seniority at their jobs, and are more willing to 
borrow for a variety of reasons.108  Notably, the changes in occupation, job 
tenure, marital status and debt loads have been directly associated with 
increased risk of default.109  Although they are necessarily charged higher 
rates, these new credit card holders now have the choice to access their credit 
lines and finance current consumption as they see fit. 
In addition to this democratization of credit access, increases in credit 
availability and utilization among households that already owned credit cards 
also was an important factor in the increase in aggregate revolving debt in the 
1980s.  By one estimate, changes in average balances and credit card 
ownership among households in the top half of the income distribution 
accounted for most of the rise in total household credit card debt, while the 
increase in the number of households holding a credit card was responsible for 
just over one-tenth of the growth in debt between 1983 and 1989.110 
Many researchers link the increase in credit card debt, apart from all other 
forms of consumer debt, directly to a decline in credit quality and the 
uncharacteristic rise in bankruptcies that took place between the mid-1980s 
and late 1990s.111  There exist several supply side explanations that, while 
differing sharply over whether blame lies with consumers or lenders, all center 
around the increasing availability of credit cards to explain what is seen as 
irresponsibly high use of credit.  The theories are similar to the larger body of 
work, discussed earlier, that cites the democratization of credit as a cause of 
bankruptcy, but in these cases credit cards specifically are seen as the culprit.  
For instance, in his well-known book Credit Card Nation, Robert Manning 
faults, in part, aggressive marketing by credit card companies for the 
dissolution of the cognitive link between earning and savings and spending and 
borrowing that had once governed consumer finance.112  This leaves 
consumers seeking immediate gratification while feeling that credit is “free” 
money and thus fundamentally changes attitudes toward spending and debt.113  
Ausubel’s consumer behavior models also implicate credit cards.  He 
hypothesizes that consumers make suboptimal choices about credit card debt in 
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particular because they underestimate its use.114  This allows credit card 
lenders to earn high, even abnormal, profits and, in turn, solicit more new 
borrowers with credit offers.115 
Other theories incorporate the role of the credit card instrument into 
models of financial distress as an enabling factor that increases vulnerability.  
David Moss and Gibbs Johnson argue, for example, that bankruptcy filings 
have risen during the past two decades due to a redistribution of types of credit, 
with lower-income households taking on more credit card debt and high-
income households increasingly holding concentrations of secured (mainly 
mortgage) debt.116  They contend that because credit card debt is a better 
predictor of bankruptcy than secured debt, and that vulnerable low-income 
borrowers have been loaned more credit card debt, rising bankruptcies are a 
logical result.117  Similarly, Sandra Black and Donald Morgan point out that 
increases in unsecured credit are weakening borrowers’ financial positions.118  
They contend that increased debt burdens carried by borrowers since the 
proliferation of credit card lending made income disruptions of any kind much 
more worrisome for many individuals.119  Todd Zywicki also sees credit less as 
the immediate cause of bankruptcy and more as a facilitator.  He purports that 
consumers see credit cards as “credit lines of last resort.”120  Borrowers often 
tend to accumulate large amounts of credit card debt immediately prior to 
filing bankruptcy in what may be last-minute attempts to maintain financial 
solvency, or strategic moves to run up dischargeable debt.121  In either case, 
credit card availability allows these borrowers to spend beyond their means. 
Survey results show that borrowers themselves have realized increased 
credit card availability can have adverse effects; 88% think that too much 
credit is available via credit cards, and 40% think consumers would be better 
off without bank cards.122  These negative attitudes have changed dramatically 
as credit cards became more prevalent; in 2000, 42% of those surveyed said 
that credit card use was bad, compared to only 14% who responded that way in 
1977.123 
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Interestingly, though, these same surveys reveal that while consumers may 
see overuse of credit as harmful to society, they are comfortable with the role 
that credit plays in their own lives.  Ninety percent of consumers were satisfied 
with their credit card companies, and the same number say that bank credit 
cards perform a useful service.124  Indeed, compared to older forms of 
consumer credit, the bank-issued, general purpose credit card instrument has 
presented consumers with a much greater degree of convenience and 
unprecedented flexibility in determining how they want to use debt and when 
they choose to repay.  Notably, to the extent that the increase in aggregate 
credit card debt is associated with convenience use rather than with the 
revolving credit feature, households are not made more financially vulnerable.  
Research shows that convenience use of credit cards may have risen as fast as 
15% per year between 1992 and 2001, and that if growth had stayed at 1992 
levels, outstanding credit card debt would have been 7.5% percent lower by 
2001.125  This demonstrates that consumers do recognize, and are taking 
advantage of, the convenience features of the credit card instrument. 
More generally, once all of the benefits are weighed against the costs of 
using credit cards versus other payment methods, credit cards have been shown 
to be the most beneficial for consumers in many cases.126  While this does not 
imply that all parties to a transaction are going to benefit economically from a 
shift towards credit card use, consumers as a group are likely to see gains.  
Finally, consumers are frequently attracted to credit cards over other types of 
debt because they represent a less expensive payment option than the 
alternatives.127  Zywicki cites this logic when arguing that consumer use of 
high interest rate credit card debt has not in fact had an impact on debt service 
burdens, since it represents a substitution away from even more costly forms of 
debt.128  In many instances, then, the use of credit cards is not an indication of 
consumer gullibility or lack of savvy at the hands of sophisticated lenders, but 
rather a rational and legitimate choice. 
Thus, while the flexibility and choice offered by the credit card instrument 
have undoubtedly raised the overall economic welfare of consumers and 
increased the efficiency of consumer credit markets, there are compelling 
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arguments demonstrating the adverse consequences felt by millions of 
households.  The social policy implications and appropriate remedies are still 
under debate.  From a risk management perspective, however, the credit card 
has truly and irreversibly revolutionized the fundamentals of consumer 
finance. 
C. Credit Scoring 
Credit scoring allows for the quantification of a borrower’s likelihood to 
repay a loan, based on historical outcomes of loans made to borrowers with 
similar characteristics.129 Although mathematical analysis of credit 
applications was introduced as far back as the 1950s, it was not until the 1990s 
that advances in communications and information technology made it possible 
to fully automate the business of granting consumer credit.130  Now, credit 
bureaus have created sophisticated statistical models that use low-cost, 
standardized information on household credit use and credit performance to 
generate credit scores.  While many details of the credit scoring methodologies 
are still proprietary, Fair Isaac & Co. revealed in 2000 that about 35% of the 
score is based on the borrowers’ history of repayment, 30% is based on how 
much of available lines of credit a borrower has drawn down, 15% depends on 
the length of the credit history, 10% relates to the types of credit used, and the 
final 10% is based on the pattern of credit used.131  This modeling technology 
is now widely use by credit card, mortgage, home equity, auto and other 
consumer lenders.  The credit scores, in turn, are used by the financial 
marketplace to target customers, underwrite loans, and estimate the value of 
asset-backed securities based on consumer and mortgage loans. 
The 2001 recession offered the first test of the new credit scoring 
technology during an economic downturn.  While no model claims perfect 
predictive power, today’s models for prime loans generally demonstrate a high 
degree of correlation between predicted and actual performance.  Subprime 
lenders, however, discovered that their models had a troubling tendency to 
underestimate losses during the downturn.132  For example, a January 2002 
Federal Reserve survey found that more than 66% of senior loan officers felt 
that actual subprime consumer loan performance over the previous year had 
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been worse then they had been expecting based on their models’ predictions.133  
In comparison, only 39% felt their models had underpredicted problems with 
standard consumer loan performance.134  This is problematic because lenders 
that significantly overestimate credit performance have found themselves 
sustaining losses that sometimes lead to failure.135  Lenders with inaccurate 
models have had to reevaluate not only the models themselves, but also their 
business strategies.  Only with models that provide a reliable estimate of credit 
losses at all points in the business cycle can consumer lenders ensure 
profitability over the longer term. 
Credit scoring and quantification have other potential downsides as well.  
Rapid changes in how consumer data are collected and disseminated are 
raising important issues associated with data accuracy, information security, 
and privacy.  Even though data collection techniques have become much more 
refined in recent years, there still may be issues of accuracy, timeliness, 
consistency, and completeness.  For example, a Federal Reserve report found 
that on over 33% of credit reports studied, at least one credit account credit 
limit was not reported.136  In over 13% of these cases, the inclusion of this 
information would have had a major upward impact (greater than ten points) 
on the individual’s credit score.137  It is interesting to note that these types of 
data anomalies impact specific classes of borrowers differently.  Thirty-eight 
percent of borrowers with credit scores below 600 would have seen a major 
increase in their credit scores if the unreported credit limit were corrected, but 
only 10% of those with credit scores above 660 would have their scores 
similarly affected.138  It is clear, then, that consumers will need to be better 
educated and more proactive in monitoring and verifying their credit files on 
an ongoing basis. 
Other drawbacks of massive credit data collection include an increased 
incidence of financial fraud and identity theft, in which thieves secure 
mortgages against property they do not own, or manufacture identifying 
information for a non-existent borrower.  These cases remind banks and credit 
bureaus that they must be vigilant about protecting consumer information.  The 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 provides numerous 
provisions about information security, many of which will be implemented by 
credit bureaus themselves.139  The industry will have to remain alert to the fact 
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that fraudulent borrowers may learn how to beat the automated credit scores 
and underwriting systems.140  Finally, lenders must recognize that current data 
limitations mean that credit models cannot control for changes in local 
economic circumstances and individual trigger events.  This reduces their 
effectiveness in certain cases and suggests an area for further refinement.141 
That said, the elements of the consumer lending revolution would not have 
been able to evolve as they have in the absence of enhanced quantitative 
analysis.  Strong modeling capabilities clearly improve the quality and flow of 
information between borrower and lender, and even between third parties, 
thereby enhancing market efficiency.  Credit scoring also leads to quicker loan 
approval decisions, while reducing costs by increasing productivity, as loan 
officers need only manually review cases that are less than clear-cut.  In sum, 
widespread credit scoring has lowered the barriers to entry, enhanced 
competition among lenders, and encouraged the increase in lending that is key 
to the supply side revolution.142 
D. Risk-Based Pricing 
Improvements in the availability and accuracy of data that describe the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers have been instrumental in allowing 
consumer and mortgage lenders to overcome the most important consequence 
of asymmetric information in credit markets—the problem of adverse 
selection.  In the context of credit markets, adverse selection arises when 
lenders know less than borrowers about their true probability of default.143  
Without the ability to precisely quantify that probability, the lender can only 
offer to make loans at a rate that reflects the average risk of borrowers.144  But 
at such a price, lower-risk borrowers will tend to decline the offer while 
higher-risk borrowers will tend to accept, thereby raising the average risk of 
borrowers who accept offers of credit.145  Even where interest rates are 
unregulated, there may not be an equilibrium interest rate high enough to allow 
lenders to charge for the average risk of borrowers who accept their offer.  In 
such a case, an alternative strategy is to set the interest rate at some pre-
determined level and then to screen borrowers according to their estimated 
level of risk, in a process known as credit rationing. 
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Under this theoretical process, it is natural for lenders to exclude borrowers 
that they perceive to be too risky to lend to at the prevailing rate of interest.  
This process represents the rationale under which certain classes of risky 
borrowers traditionally have been excluded from bank lending programs.  
However, two factors can, in principal, counteract the adverse selection 
problem and make credit available to more (and riskier) borrowers.  One is the 
ability to charge a higher interest rate.  While there may be borrowers who are 
deemed too risky at any reasonable rate of interest, the proportion of borrowers 
screened out by the lender declines with a higher absolute rate of interest.  This 
is the rationale behind the conclusion that the elimination of usury ceilings on 
credit card loans was in itself sufficient to bring about an expansion in the 
provision of credit to more (and riskier) borrowers.146  The other factor that 
will clearly result in the provision of credit to more and riskier borrowers is the 
ability to more precisely estimate the probability of default for individual 
borrowers, enabling companies to offer different interest rates to safer and 
riskier borrowers, respectively. 
As the quality of credit bureau data and the effectiveness of credit models 
have improved, it has become possible for lenders to identify lower-risk 
borrowers and to offer them a better deal on their credit cards.  Mark Furletti 
has documented the decline in prime credit card interest rates in the 1990s and 
has attributed it in part to credit scoring and improvements in information.147  
As the marketplace has competed more intensively for the business of prime 
borrowers, it has been increasingly difficult to get prime borrowers to continue 
to accept the higher interest rates that they were offered when they were 
lumped in with riskier consumers, that is, when there was essentially one credit 
card rate offered to all potential borrowers.148  As a consequence, the only way 
that credit can continue to be offered to riskier borrowers is at higher 
“subprime” rates of interest.  As before, the rationale for profitability of any 
individual loan program is that the revenue earned from borrowers who repay 
their loans must more than compensate for the losses incurred on borrowers 
who fail to repay.149  Therefore, as improvements in information and modeling 
allow low-risk borrowers to get a better deal, it stands to reason that high-risk 
borrowers will pay more for credit, even as more credit is made available to 
them.150 
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These theoretical considerations are largely consistent with both the 
decline in interest rates offered to prime credit card customers and the 
emergence of subprime loan programs (particularly in the markets for loans 
secured by autos and residential real estate) that were observed in the 1990s. 
E. Securitization 
Improvements in information systems and the quantification of risk have 
also contributed to the successful application of the principles of securitization 
to the various classes of consumer loan receivables, including subprime 
consumer loans.  Securitization represents one of the most important new 
techniques that have been applied to mortgage and consumer finance during 
the past fifty years.  Compared to the traditional methods of financing loans by 
holding them on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries, securitization 
offers lenders a variety of benefits, including: 1) the opportunity to quickly 
access large amounts of investment capital on favorable terms, and 2) the 
ability to move assets and credit risks off their balance sheets, thereby 
minimizing the amount of capital the institution must hold.  These benefits, in 
turn, allow lenders to make more credit available to mortgage and consumer 
borrowers and to do so more consistently as financial market conditions 
change over time. 
Securitization refers to the issuance of debt securities that are secured by 
dedicated pools of cash-producing assets (most commonly loans and leases).  
This process, as we know it today, was originally introduced in the early 1970s 
by the U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (or “GSEs”) involved with 
mortgage finance.  In 1970, the Government National Mortgage Association 
(“GNMA” or “Ginnie Mae”) issued the first mortgage-backed pass-through 
securities (or MBS).151  The other mortgage-related GSEs, including the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA” or “Fannie Mae”) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC” or “Freddie Mac”), 
soon followed suit.  MBS securities issued by these companies are backed by 
the cash flows derived from the underlying mortgage loans and are guaranteed 
by the issuing agency.  The so-called “agency” MBS market grew quickly after 
its introduction, reaching $114 billion in outstanding obligations in 1980, $1.02 
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trillion in 1990, and $2.49 trillion in 2000.152  An important variation on this 
process was introduced in the 1980s with the introduction of collateralized 
mortgage obligations (“CMOs”).  Under the CMO structure, the securities 
issued differ in terms of the priority of the claims they hold on the proceeds of 
the mortgage pool.  The benefit of this structure is that the securities issued can 
be separated into high-risk (or subordinate) and low-risk (or senior) tranches 
(or groups), allowing investors to choose the risk class that best suits their 
investment needs.153  The existence of subordinate, or first-loss, tranches 
means that the senior tranches are made comparatively less risky.  This method 
of credit enhancement facilitated the introduction of private-label MBS 
securities that do not benefit from being guaranteed by a government-
sponsored enterprise.  Privately-issued residential MBS were introduced in 
1984, and quickly grew to $56 billion in 1990 and $474 billion in 2000.154  
Taken together, the total value of mortgage debt held by agency and private-
label mortgage pools exceeded the mortgage debt held by FDIC-insured banks 
and savings institutions for the first time in 1987.  By 2002, public and private 
mortgage pools held 65% more mortgage debt than FDIC-insured institutions. 
A critical element in the development of mortgage securitization has been 
the development of standardized terms and documentation for loans placed 
into mortgage pools.  As the agency MBS market developed, these standards 
were built around the notion of “conforming” loans that could be purchased 
and securitized by the mortgage GSEs under their loan purchase guidelines.  
During the 1990s, the mortgage GSEs went one step further by introducing 
automated underwriting systems (such as Freddie Mac’s Loan Prospector 
system) that collect standardized data for each loan and borrower, and then 
calculate a credit score that determines the suitability of the loan for purchase, 
thereby reducing the cost of originating a mortgage loan by as much as 
$1,000.155 
During the 1990s, automated underwriting and credit scoring models were 
similarly applied to the origination of various classes of non-mortgage 
consumer loans.  The availability of standardized loan data and credit scoring 
helped to facilitate the application of securitization techniques to consumer 
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loans during the 1990s.156  Figure 7 shows that the annual issuance of 
consumer-related asset-backed securities rose from less that $50 billion in 
1990 to over half a trillion dollars in 2003.  During this period, the total 
volume of consumer and home equity debt outstanding rose by 151% to $2.7 
trillion.157  The securitization process applied to consumer and home equity 
loans resembles that applied to CMOs to the extent that the credit ratings of the 
senior tranches of debt are enhanced by the creation of subordinate tranches 
that are in a first-loss position.  However, asset-backed securities tend to be 
somewhat more complicated to structure than MBS because in many cases the 
underlying assets are non-amortizing, as in the case of credit card 
receivables.158 
Advances in information technology have played an essential role in 
facilitating the growth in the securitization of mortgage and consumer loans.159  
Specific functions of the securitization process that require modern information 
technology systems include loan origination and underwriting, accounting and 
collection of payments, loan servicing and investor servicing.160  Securitization 
was difficult, if not impossible, to implement before these capabilities were 
introduced.  However, as depicted in Figure 8, the percentage of total mortgage 
debt held by mortgage pools, asset-backed issuers and GSEs grew rapidly in 
the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a similar pattern of growth in the 
securitization of consumer loans in the 1990s.  These trends show the extent to 
which loan securitization has transformed the way mortgage and consumer 
loans are financed, making securitization an essential element in the consumer 
lending revolution. 
F. How the Elements of the Consumer Lending Revolution Work Together 
The five elements of the consumer lending revolution have worked 
together to transform the business models by which lenders approach this 
market.  First, the increasing use of information technology has allowed the 
development of a global credit card network that can be operated at relatively 
low cost.  Information technologies also have been applied to other aspects of 
 
 156. The importance of credit scoring to securitization is emphasized by Cynthia A. Glassman 
and Howard M. Wilkins, in Credit Scoring: Probabilities and Pitfalls, J. RETAIL BANK. SERVICE, 
Summer 1997, at 54–55. 
 157. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 9, at tbls.L.218 & 100. 
 158. In such cases, revolving loans may be securitized using a “controlled amortization” 
structure that resembles a sinking fund. See About MBS/ABS, The Bond Market Association, 
InvestinginBonds.com, at http://www.investingbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=11 (last visited 
April 18, 2005). 
 159. See e.g., Nigel A.L. Brooks, Systems and Securitization, BANKING MANAGEMENT, 
March 1990, at 32; Caroline Wilson, Automated Underwriting Goes Mainstream, 7 AMER. 
COMMUNITY BANK., April 1998, at 36–39. 
 160. Brooks, supra note 159 at 32. 
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the business, including the mass marketing techniques employed by 
nationwide lenders.  Just as important, information technologies permit the 
quantification of consumer data, enabling lenders to more precisely evaluate 
the probability of default for individual borrowers.  Using quantitative data for 
individual customers and pools of loans, lenders are able to apply credit 
modeling techniques to better price their offerings according to risk.  As 
described above, the ability to price according to risk helps lenders overcome 
the adverse selection problem that tends to arise in one-price credit markets.  
This allows lenders to make loans to a wider spectrum of borrowers with 
varying levels of default risk.  But this ability to offer higher-risk borrowers 
credit at higher rates has only been able to take place within a deregulated 
interest rate environment.  Quantification also gives lenders the ability to 
measure the risk associated with pools of consumer and mortgage loans, 
thereby allowing them to structure securitization trusts that can meet their 
obligations even under higher-than-expected default levels.  Only with the 
transparency offered by risk quantification can investors be persuaded to buy 
the bonds issued against securitization trusts, thereby providing a large portion 
of the trillions of dollars per year that flow annually through the consumer and 
mortgage credit markets. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION IN CONSUMER LENDING 
Associating the rising indicators of household financial distress with the 
supply-side revolution in consumer lending leads to important policy 
implications.  First, this conclusion suggests that a reduction in personal 
bankruptcy filings and problem consumer loans is unlikely to occur as a result 
of either an improvement in the performance of the economy or a change in 
consumer behavior.  It also argues against the case that a significant reduction 
in household credit distress can be achieved by altering the legal framework of 
bankruptcy.  Our conclusion instead suggests that the current high-loss 
household credit environment is largely the result of changes in the delivery of 
household credit that are being driven by new technologies and competitive 
forces in the marketplace, assisted by the deregulation of interest rates on 
consumer loans and deposit rates. As such, these conditions can be expected to 
remain in place indefinitely.  To the extent that these changes are responsible 
for a rising incidence of financial distress, it should also be recognized that 
they are associated with an expansion in the availability of household credit, 
greater operational efficiency in providing this credit, and a greater ability to 
manage risks in retail lending.  Therefore, regulatory changes that might be 
designed to reduce household financial distress by rolling back these 
marketplace changes are likely to have negative side effects for both borrowers 
and lenders. 
The idea that a consumer lending revolution underlies the observed 
increases in household financial distress also has implications for how other 
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key yardsticks of household well-being should be interpreted.  The changes 
associated with the consumer lending revolution are fully consistent with 
higher observed levels of household indebtedness and an expansion in the 
availability of credit to new classes of borrowers—particularly those at the 
lower end of the income spectrum.161  Moreover, we cite evidence that these 
changes are primarily responsible for the increasing incidence of household 
financial distress over the last 20 years.162  However, these observations leave 
unanswered the question of how the net welfare of households has been 
affected by these changes.  Would U.S. households (or certain segments of the 
population) have been better off if the consumer lending revolution had not 
taken place?  Would a world of less-available credit and lower levels of 
bankruptcies be a better world for those households?  While these questions 
remain open to debate, it is difficult to argue that expanding the menu of 
financial choices available to U.S. households has reduced their welfare. To do 
so appears to require one to argue that expanding the menu of financial choices 
somehow reduces the ability of households to make good financial decisions, 
resulting in higher financial distress without offsetting benefits resulting from 
the greater availability of credit.  However, this is exactly the type of argument 
that has been made by a number of researchers to explain what is apparently 
non-rational behavior on the part of household borrowers in certain contexts.163 
To the extent that these market failures lead to sub-optimal outcomes in 
financial markets, then it remains possible that consumer welfare could be 
enhanced by regulatory changes that help households make better financial 
decisions. 
Clearly, additional research is needed to explore how changes in the 
financial marketplace may be affecting the ability of households to make sound 
financial decisions. But until clear marketplace failures are identified and 
understood, new regulations intended to improve consumer welfare should be 
approached warily, for they are as likely to do harm as to do good.  In the 
meantime, a more effective means of promoting better financial decision-
making by households would be to expand the financial education efforts 
currently being undertaken by regulators, financial institutions, schools, and 
community groups.164  There is already clear evidence that financial education 
efforts have been effective in facilitating effective decision-making by 
households.165  These efforts represent an unambiguously positive policy 
 
 161. See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 162. See infra Part III.D. 
 163. See infra Part III.C. 
 164. Susan Burhouse, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FYI: Delivery Systems for 
Financial Education in Theory and Practice (2004), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/fyi/2004/092204fyi.html (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 165. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
396 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:363 
response to the changes that continue to add both opportunity and complexity 
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Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table B.100 (Disposable 
Incomes; Bureau of Census, Current Population Survey (Total Resident 
Population); Bureau of Labor Statistics (Consumer Price Index).
Year
Inflation-Adjusted Disposable Personal Income Per Capita (2003 Dollars)
Figure 1
Real per capita incomes have risen in each of the past four 
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Household Net Worth as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income
Figure 2
Despite stock market downturn, household net worth-to-income 
was higher in 2003 than at any point prior to 1997. 
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Source:  Federal Reserve Board. 1. Flow of Funds, Table B.100 (Mortgage debt 






Mortgage and Consumer Debt as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income
Figure 4
Household indebtedness has surged as a percent of income since the 
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Source:  Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey Table F-2.  Share of 
Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All 
Races):  1947 to 2001. http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f02.html
Year
Share of Aggregate Income Received by The Top 20 Percent of U.S. Families, 
Ranked by Income (Percent)
Figure 3
The share of income received by the top 20 percent of families 
has grown since 1980. 
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Source: Bureau of the Census (Total U.S. Population, Both Sexes); 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Court (U.S. Non-business Bankruptcy Filings).
1984
282,105 filings
1.2 per thousand population
2004
1,599,986 filings
5.5 per thousand population
1960
132,559 filings
0.6 per thousand population
Year
Number of Personal Bankruptcy Filings (Shaded)
Figure 6
Annual per capita personal bankruptcy filings rose more than four-
fold between 1984 and 1998. 
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Source:  Federal Reserve Board. The homeowner mortgage FOR includes payments on 
mortgage debt, homeowners' insurance, and property taxes, while the homeowner 
consumer FOR includes payments on consumer debt and automobile leases.  Year
Homeowners Financial Obligations Ratio for Homeowners (Percent of Monthly Income)
Figure 5
A shift toward mortgage debt and declining mortgage rates have 
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Source: Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds , Series L.127 Year
Total Consumer Loans Held by Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), 
Dollars in Billions
Figure 7
The outstanding volume of securitized consumer loans quadrupled 
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Source:  Authors' calculations based of data from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of 
Funds , Series L.218 (Mortgage Debt) and L.222 (Consumer Debt).
Year
Percent of Oustanding Mortgage and Consumer Debt Held by Mortgage Securitization Pools, 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, and Asset-Backed Security Issuers
Figure 8
Securitization of consumer loans grew rapidly in the 1990s, following 




SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
400 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:363 
 
